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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last two centuries have been characterized by a great divergence in income per capita across
the globe. The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest and the poorest regions of the world
has widened considerably from a modest 3 to 1 ratio in 1820 to an 18 to 1 ratio in 2001 (Maddison
(2001)).1 The role of geographical and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic,
linguistic, and religious fractionalization, colonialism and globalization has been the center of a
debate about the origin of this remarkable change in the world income distribution.
This paper argues that favorable geographical conditions that were inherently associated
with inequality in the distribution of land ownership, adversely aﬀected the emergence of human
capital promoting institutions (e.g., public schooling and child labor regulations), and thus the
pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing
to the emergence of the Great Divergence in income per capita across countries. Consistently
with the recent ﬁndings of Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) about the
dominating role of human capital rather than the quality of political institutions in the process
of development, the proposed theory underlines the role of human capital, and thus of human
capital promoting institutions, in the emergence of the Great Divergence.2
The theory further suggests that the qualitative change in the role of land in the process
of industrialization created changes in the ranking of countries in the world income distribution.
Some land abundant countries which were associated with the club of the rich economies in the
pre-industrial revolution era and were characterized by an unequal distribution of land, were
overtaken in the process of industrialization by land scarce countries and were dominated by
other land abundant economies in which land distribution was rather equal.
The accumulation of physical capital has raised the importance of human capital in the
process of industrialization, reﬂecting the complementarity between capital and skills. Invest-
ment in human capital, however, has been sub-optimal due to credit markets imperfections,
and public investment in education has been therefore growth enhancing.3 Nevertheless, human
1Some researchers (e.g., Jones (1997) and Pritchett (1997)) have demonstrated that this diverging pattern
persisted in the last decades as well. Interestingly, however, as established by Sala-i-Martin (2002), the phenomena
has not been maintained across people in the world (i.e., when national boundaries are removed).
2The signiﬁcant role of human capital in economic growth is documented in Barro (1991) as well as others.
Studies based on growth accounting methods generate conﬂicting evidence about the direct role of human capital
in the growth process. Most of the existing studies (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999)), attribute the diﬀerences in income
per-capita across countries largely to diﬀerences in TFP, whereas some (e.g., Manuali and Seshadri (2005)) provide
evidence in favor of the dominating role of human capital. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if the direct
role of human capital is limited, as established by Glaeser et al. (2004), it has a large indirect eﬀect on growth
via its eﬀect on technological progress and the implementation of growth enhancing institution.
3See Galor and Zeira (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and Benabou (2000).
1capital accumulation has not beneﬁted all sectors of the economy. Due to a low degree of com-
plementarity between human capital and land,4 universal public education has increased the
cost of labor beyond the increase in the average labor productivity in the agricultural sector,
reducing the return to land. Landowners, therefore, had no economic incentives to support these
growth enhancing educational policies as long as their stake in the productivity of the industrial
sector was insuﬃcient.5
The theory suggests that the adverse eﬀect of the implementation of universal public
education on landowners’ income from agricultural production is magniﬁed by the concentration
of land ownership.6 Hence, as long as landowners have aﬀected the political process and thereby
the implementation of education reforms, inequality in the distribution of land ownership has
been a hurdle for human capital accumulation slowing the process of industrialization and the
transition to modern growth.7 In these economies an ineﬃcient education policy persisted and
the growth path was retarded. In contrast, in societies in which agricultural land was scarce
or land ownership was distributed rather equally, growth enhancing education policies were
implemented.8
The process of industrialization fueled by the accumulation of physical capital, has raised
the interest of landowners in the productivity of the industrial sector and brought about a qual-
itative change in landowners’ attitudes towards education reforms. In particular, economies
4Although, rapid technological change in the agricultural sector may increase the return to human capital (e.g.,
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996)), the return to education is typically lower in the agricultural sector, as evident by
the distribution of employment in the agricultural sector. For instance, as reported by the U.S. department of
Agriculture (1998), 56.9% of agricultural employment consists of high school dropouts, in contrast to an average
of 13.7% in the economy as a whole. Similarly, 16.6% of agricultural employment consists of workers with 13 or
more years of schooling, in contrast to an average of 54.5% in the economy as a whole.
5Landowners, as well as other owners of factors of production, inﬂuence the level of public schooling but are
limited in their power to levy taxes for their own beneﬁt. Otherwise, following the Coasian Theorem, the landed
elite would prefer an optimal level of education, taxing the resulting increase in aggregate income. Nevertheless,
landowners may beneﬁt from the economic development of other segments of the economy due to capital ownership,
household’s labor supply to the industrial sector, the provision of public goods, and demand spillover from
economic development of the urban sector.
6The proposed mechanism focuses on the emergence of public education. Alternatively, one could have focused
on child labor regulation, linking it to human capital formation as in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), or on the
endogenous abolishment of slavery (e.g., Lagerlof (2003)) and the incentives it creates for investment in human
capital.
7Consistently with the proposed theory, Deininger and Squire (1998) document that the level of education and
economic growth over the period 1960-1992 are inversely related to land inequality (across landowners) and the
relationship is more pronounced in developing countries.
8The adverse relationship between natural resources and growth is documented even in smaller time frames.
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2001) document a signiﬁcant inverse relationship between natural re-
sources and growth in the post World-War II era. Gylfason ﬁnds that a 10% increase in the amount of natural
capital is associated with a fall of about 1% in the growth rate. Furthermore, based on a cross section study,
he reports signiﬁcant negative relationships between the share of natural capital in national wealth, and public
spending on education, expected years of schooling, and secondary-school enrollments, concluding that natural
resources crowd out human capital formation.
2in which land was equally distributed implemented earlier growth-enhancing public education,
leading to the emergence of a skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of develop-
ment. In contrast, among economies marked by an unequal distribution of land ownership, land
abundance that was a source of richness in early stages of development, led in later stages to
under-investment in human capital, unskilled-intensive industrial sector, and a slower growth
process.9 Thus, variations in the distribution of land ownership across countries generated vari-
ations in the industrial composition of the economy, and thereby the observed diverging growth
patterns across the globe.10
Evidence suggests that indeed the distribution of land within and across countries aﬀected
the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy and has been signiﬁcant
in the emergence of sustained diﬀerences in human capital, income levels, and growth patterns
across countries.11 The link between land reforms and the increase in governmental investment
in education that is apparent in the process of development of several countries lends credence
to the proposed theory.
The process of development in Korea was marked by a major land reform followed by a
massive increase in governmental expenditure on education. During the Japanese occupation
in the period 1905-1945, land distribution in Korea became increasingly skewed and in 1945
nearly 70% of Korean farming households were simply tenants [Eckert, 1990]. In 1949, the
Republic of Korea instituted the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act that drastically
aﬀected landholdings. Owner cultivated farm households increased from 349,000 in 1949 to
1,812,000 in 1950, and tenant farm households declined from 1,133,000 in 1949 to nearly zero in
1950 [Yoong, 2000]. Consistent with the proposed theory, following the decline in the inequal-
ity in the distribution of land, expenditure on education soared. In 1948, Korea allocated 8%
of government expenditures to education. Following a slight decline due to the Korean war,
educational expenditure has increased to 9.2% in 1957 and 14.9% in 1960, remaining at about
15% thereafter. Land reforms and the subsequent increase in governmental investment in edu-
cation were followed by a stunning growth performance that permitted Korea to nearly triple
9According to the theory, therefore, land reform would bring about an increase in the investment in human
capital. The diﬀerential increase in the productivity of workers in the industrial and the agricultural sectors would
generate migration from the agricultural to the industrial sector accompanied by an increase in agricultural wages
and a decline in agricultural employment. Consistent with the proposed theory, Besley and Burgess (2000) ﬁnd
that over the period 1958-1992 in India, land reforms have raised agricultural wages, despite an adverse eﬀect on
agricultural output.
10As established by Chanda and Dalgaard (2003), variations in the structural composition of economies and in
particular the allocation of scarce inputs between the agriculture and the non-agriculture sectors are important
determinants of international diﬀerences in TFP, accounting for between 30 and 50 percents of these variations.
11See Gerber (1991), Coleman and Caselli (2001) and Bertocchi (2002) as well.
3its income relative to the United States in about twenty years, from 9% in 1965 to 25% in 1985.
Hence, consistently with the proposed theory, prior to its land reforms Korea’s income level
was well below that of land-abundant countries in North and South America. However, in the
aftermath of the Korean’s land reform and the subsequent rise in human capital accumulation,
Korea overtook some land abundant countries in South America that were characterized by an
unequal distribution of land.
North and South America provide anecdotal evidence for diﬀerences in the process of
development, and possibly overtaking, due to the eﬀects of the distribution of land ownership
on education reforms within land-abundant economies. As argued by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(2000) the original colonies in North and South America had vast amounts of land per person
and income levels comparable to the European ones. North and Latin America diﬀered in
the distribution of land and resources. The United States and Canada were deviant cases
in their relatively egalitarian distribution of land. For the rest of the new world, land and
resources were concentrated in the hand of a very few, and this concentration persisted over a
very long period.12 Consistent with the proposed theory, these diﬀerences in land distribution
between North and Latin America, were associated with signiﬁcant diﬀerences in investment
in human capital. As argued by Coatsworth (1993 pp 26-7) in the US there was a widespread
property ownership, early public commitment to educational spending, and a lesser degree of
concentration of wealth and income whereas in Latin America public investment in human
capital remained well below the levels achieved at comparable levels of national income in more
developed countries.13 Furthermore, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000) maintain that although all
of the economies in the western hemisphere were rich enough in the early 19th century to have
established primary schools, only the United States and Canada made the investments necessary
to educate the general population.
The proposed theory further suggests that the divergence in the growth performance of
North and Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century, (e.g., Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico vs. the US and Canada), may be attributed in part to the more equal
distribution of land in the North, whereas the overtaking (e.g., Mexico and Columbia overtaken
by Korea and Taiwan) may be attributed to the positive eﬀect of land abundance in early stages
of development and the adverse eﬀect of its unequal distribution in later stages of development.
12For instance, in Mexico in 1910, 0.2% of the active rural population owned 87% of the land [Estevo, 1983].
13As argued by Engerman and Sokolof (2000), even among Latin American countries variations in the degree
of inequality in the distribution of land ownership were reﬂected in variation in investment in human capital. In
particular, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in which land inequality was less pronounces invested signiﬁcantly more
in education.
4Moreover, Nugent and Robinson (2002) show that in Costa Rica and Colombia where coﬀee is
typically grown in small farms (reﬂecting lower inequality in the distribution of land) income
and human capital are signiﬁcantly higher than that of Guatemala and El Salvador where coﬀee
plantations are rather large.14
2 Related Literature
The role of institutional factors has been the focus of an inﬂuential hypothesis regarding the
origin of the great divergence. North (1981), Landes (1998), Mokyr (1990, 2002), Parente and
Prescott (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have argued that institutions that
facilitated the protection of property rights, enhancing technological research and the diﬀusion
of knowledge, have been the prime factor that enabled the earlier European take-oﬀ and the
great technological divergence across the globe.15
The eﬀect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been
emphasized by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997) and Sachs and Werner (1995).16 The geographical
hypothesis suggests that more favorable geographical conditions made Europe less vulnerable
to the risk associated with climate and diseases, leading to the early European take-oﬀ,w h e r e a s
adverse geographical conditions in disadvantageous regions, generated permanent hurdles for
the process of development, contributing to the great divergence.17
The exogenous nature of the geographical factors and the inherent endogeneity of the
institutional factors lead researchers to hypothesize that initial geographical conditions had a
persistent eﬀect on the quality of institutions, leading to divergence and overtaking in economic
performance. Engerman and Sokolof (2000) provide descriptive evidence that geographical con-
ditions that led to income inequality, brought about oppressive institutions (e.g., restricted access
to the democratic process) designed to maintain the political power of the elite and to preserve
the existing inequality, whereas geographical characteristics that generated an equal distribu-
14In contrast to the proposed theory, Nugent and Robinson (2002) suggest that a holdup problem generated by
the monopsony power in large plantations prevents commitment to reward investment in human capital, whereas
small holders can capture the reward to human capital and have therefore the incentive to invest. Moreover,
unlike our theory, their mechanism does not generate the economic forces that permit the economy to escape this
institutional trap.
15Divergence could also emerge from diﬀerences in legal origins (Gleaser and Shleifer (2002). Barriers to tech-
nological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu,
Aghion and Zilibotti (2005).
16See Hall and Jones (1999), Masters and McMillan (2001) and Hibbs and Olson (2004) as well.
17Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) reject, in a cross section analysis, the geographical determinism, but main-
tain nevertheless that favorable geographical conditions have mattered for economic growth since they increased
the likelihood of an economy to escape a poverty trap.
5tion of income led to the emergence of growth promoting institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2002) provide evidence that reversals in economic performance across countries have
a colonial origin, reﬂecting institutional reversals that were introduced by European colonialism
across the globe.18 “Reversals of fortune” reﬂect the imposition of extractive institutions by the
European colonialists in regions where favorable geographical conditions led to prosperity, and
the implementation of growth enhancing institutions in poorer regions.19 Furthermore, the role
of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization in the emergence of divergence and “growth
tragedies” has been linked to their eﬀect on the quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine
(1997)).
The role of human capital in the process of development is underlined in the uniﬁed
growth theories of Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002, 2004), Galor and Mountford
(2003), Doepke (2004), Lagerlof (2004), as well as others. These theories establish theoretically
and quantitatively that the rise in the technologically driven demand for human capital in the
second phase of industrialization and its eﬀect on human capital formation and on the onset
of the demographic transitions have been the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to
growth and thus in the emergence of the associated phenomena of the great divergence.
Empirical research is inconclusive about the signiﬁcance of institutional factors in the
process of development. Some researchers suggest that initial geographical conditions aﬀected
the current economic performance primarily via their eﬀect on institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)
provide evidence that variations in the contemporary growth processes across countries can be
attributed to institutional factors whereas geographical factors operate primarily via variations
in institutions. Moreover, Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) demonstrate
that geopolitical factors brought about a high degree of fractionalization in some regions of the
world, leading to the implementation of institutions that are not conducive for economic growth
and thereby to diverging growth paths across regions.
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) revisit the debate whether polit-
ical institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital
accumulation lead to institutional improvement. In contrast to earlier studies, they ﬁnd that
human capital is a more fundamental source of growth than political institutions (i.e., risk of
18Additional aspects of the role of colonialism in comparative developments are analyzed by Bertocchi and
Canova (2002).
19Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), in contrast, attribute technological leapfrogging to the acquired compar-
ative advantage (via learning by doing) of the current technological leaders in the use of the existing technologies.
6expropriation by the government, government eﬀectiveness, and constraints on the executives).
Moreover, they argue that poor countries emerge from poverty through good policies (e.g.,
human capital promoting policies) and only subsequently improve their political institutions.
In contrast to the earlier literature on the role of human capital in the process of develop-
ment, the proposed theory endogenizes the formation of human capital promoting institutions,
underlining the role of the distribution of land ownership in the variations in the emergence
of public education, and thereby in the Great Divergence. It generates predictions that are
consistent with the recent ﬁndings of Glaeser et al. (2004) about the dominating role of human
capital, rather than the quality of political institutions, in the process of development, as well
as with the evidence regarding the eﬀect of land inequality on human capital formation and
economic growth.
The proposed theory diﬀers in several important dimensions from the earlier analysis
by Engerman and Sokolof (2000) of the relationship between geographically-based inequality
and institutions. First, the theory suggests that a conﬂict of interest among the economic
elites i.e., industrialists and landowners (rather than between the ruling elite and the masses
as argued by Engerman and Sokolof) brought about the delay in the implementation of growth
enhancing educational policies. Second, consistent with existing cross sectional evidence, the
theory underlines the adverse eﬀect of unequal distribution of land ownership (rather than
wealth inequality as suggested by Engerman and Sokolof) in the timing of educational reforms.
Third, the theory focuses on the direct economic incentive (i.e., the adverse eﬀect of education
reforms on the land rental rate) that induces the landed elite to block education reforms, rather
than on the eﬀect of reforms on the distribution of political power and thus the degree of rent
extraction. Forth, in contrast to Engerman and Sokolof’s static viewpoint of the desirability of
extractive institutions for the ruling elite, the proposed theory suggests that the desirability of
the implementation of eﬃcient institutions may gradually emerge in the process of development,
generating the observed variations in the timing of growth promoting educational reforms.20
A complementary approach suggests that interest groups (e.g., landed aristocracy and
monopolies) block the introduction of new technologies and superior institutions in order to
protect their political power and thus maintain their rent extraction. Olson (1982), Mokyr
(1990), Parente and Prescott (2000), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argue that this type
20In contrast to the political economy mechanism proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000), where land con-
centration induces landowners to divert resources in their favor via distortionary taxation, in the proposed theory
land concentration induces lower taxation so as to assure lower public expenditure on education, resulting in
a lower economic growth. The proposed theory is therefore consistent with empirical ﬁndings that taxation is
positively related to economic growth and negatively to inequality (e.g., Benabou (1996) and Perotti (1996)).
7of conﬂict, in the context of technology adoption, has played an important role throughout
the evolution of industrial societies.21 Interestingly, the political economy interpretation of our
theory suggests, in contrast, that the industrial elite would relinquish power to the masses in
order to overcome the desire of the landed elite to block economic development.22
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in a process of development. In every period the
economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment.
The good is produced in an agricultural sector and in a manufacturing sector using land, physical
and human capital as well as raw labor. The stock of physical capital in every period is the output
produced in the preceding period net of consumption and human capital investment, whereas
the stock of human capital in every period is determined by the aggregate public investment in
education in the preceding period. The supply of land is ﬁxed over time and output grows due
to the accumulation of physical and human capital.
3.1 Production of Final Output
The output in the economy in period t, yt, is given by the aggregate output in the agricultural
sector, yA





3.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
Production in the agricultural sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-




t = F(Xt,L t), (2)
where Xt and Lt are land and the number of workers, respectively, employed by the agricultural
sector in period t. Hence, workers’ productivity in the agricultural sector is independent of
their level of human capital. The production function is strictly increasing and concave, the
two factors are complements in the production process, FXL > 0, and the function satisﬁes
21Barriers to technological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Caselli and Coleman (2002),
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003) as well.
22See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) as well.
8the neoclassical boundary conditions that assure the existence of an interior solution to the
producers’ proﬁt-maximization problem.23
Producers in the agricultural sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given
the wage rate per worker, wA
t , and the rate of return to land, ρt, producers in period t choose the
level of employment of labor, Lt, and land, Xt, so as to maximize proﬁts. That is, {Xt,L t} =
argmax [F(Xt,L t) − wtLt − ρtXt]. The producers’ inverse demand for factors of production is
therefore,
wA
t = FL(Xt,L t);
ρt = FX(Xt,L t).
(3)
3.1.2 Manufacturing Sector
Production in the manufacturing sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical,
constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using physical and human cap-






t ; kt ≡ Kt/Ht; α ∈ (0,1), (4)
where Kt and Ht are the quantities of physical capital and human capital (measured in
eﬃciency units) employed in production at time t. Both factors depreciate fully after one
period. In contrast to the agricultural sector, human capital has a positive eﬀect on workers’
productivity in the manufacturing sector, increasing workers’ eﬃciency units of labor.
Producers in the manufacturing sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Given the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of human capital, wM
t , and the rate of return to cap-
ital, Rt, producers in period t choose the level of employment of capital, Kt, and the num-













In every period a generation which consists of a continuum of individuals of measure 1 is born.
Individuals live for two periods. Each individual has a single parent and a single child. Individ-
23The abstraction from technological change is merely a simplifying assumption. The introduction of endogenous
technological change would allow output in the agricultural sector to increase over time despite the decline in the
number of workers in this sector.
9u a l s ,w i t h i na sw e l la sa c r o s sg e n e r a t i o n s ,a r ei d e n tical in their preferences and innate abilities
but they may diﬀer in their wealth.
Preferences of individual i who is born in period t (a member i of generation t)a r e
deﬁned over second period consumption,24 ci
t+1, and a transfer to the oﬀspring, bi
t+1.25 They
are represented by a log-linear utility function
ui
t =( 1− β)logci
t+1 + β logbi
t+1, (6)
where β ∈ (0,1).
In the ﬁrst period of their lives individuals devote their entire time for the acquisition of
human capital. In the second period of their lives individuals join the labor force, allocating the
resulting wage income, along with their return to capital and land, between consumption and
income transfer to their children. In addition, individuals transfer their entire stock of land to
their oﬀspring.
An individual i born in period t receives a transfer, bi
t, in the ﬁrst period of life. A fraction
τt ≥ 0 of this capital transfer is collected by the government in order to ﬁnance public education,
whereas a fraction 1−τt is saved for future income. Individuals devote their ﬁrst period for the
acquisition of human capital. Education is provided publicly free of charge. The acquired level
of human capital increases with the real resources invested in public education. The number
of eﬃciency units of human capital of each member of generation t in period t +1 ,ht+1, is a
strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the government real expenditure on education
per member of generation t, et.26
ht+1 = h(et), (7)
where h(0) = 1, limet→0+ h0(et)=∞, and limet→∞ h0(et)=0 . Hence, even in the absence of
real expenditure on public education individuals posses one eﬃciency unit of human capital -
basic skills.
In the second period life, members of generation t join the labor force earning the com-
petitive market wage wt+1. In addition, individual i derives income from capital ownership,
bi
t(1 − τt)Rt+1, and from the return on land ownership, xiρt+1, where xi is the quantity of land
24For simplicity we abstract from ﬁr s tp e r i o dc o n s u m p t i o n . I tm a yb ev i ewed as part of the consumption of
the parent.
25This form of altruistic bequest motive (i.e., the “joy of giving”) is the common form in the recent literature
on income distribution and growth. It is supported empirically by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997).
26A more realistic formulation would link the cost of education to (teacher’s) wages, which may vary in the
process of development. As can be derived from section 2.4, under both formulations the optimal expenditure
on education, et, is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio in the economy, and the qualitative results
remain therefore intact.
10owned by individual i. The individual’s second period income, Ii
t+1, is therefore
Ii
t+1 = wt+1 + bi
t(1 − τt)Rt+1 + xiρt+1. (8)
Am e m b e ri of generation t allocates second period income between consumption, ci
t+1,
and transfers to the oﬀspring, bi










The indirect utility function of a member i of generation t, vi
t is therefore
vi
t =l o gIi
t+1 + ξ ≡ v(Ii
t+1), (11)
where ξ ≡ (1 − β)log(1− β)+β logβ. The indirect utility function is monotonically increasing
in Ii
t+1.
3.3 Physical Capital, Human Capital, and Output
Let Bt denote the aggregate level of intergenerational transfers in period t. It follows from (8)
and (10) that,
Bt = βyt. (12)
Af r a c t i o nτt of this capital transfer is collected by the government in order to ﬁnance public
education, whereas a fraction 1−τt is saved for future consumption. The capital stock in period
t +1 , Kt+1, is therefore
Kt+1 =( 1− τt)βyt, (13)
whereas the government tax revenues are τtβyt.
Since population is normalized to 1, the education expenditure per young individual in
period t, et,i s ,
et = τtβyt, (14)
and the stock of human capital, employed in the manufacturing sector in period t+1, Ht+1, is
therefore,
Ht+1 = θt+1h(τtβyt), (15)
27Note that individual’s preferences deﬁned over the transfer to the oﬀspring, b
i
t, or over net transfer, (1−τt)b
i
t,
are represented in an indistinguishable manner by the log linear utility function. Under both deﬁnitions of





11where, θt+1 is the fraction (and the number) of workers employed in the manufacturing sector.
Hence, output in the manufacturing sector in period t +1i s ,
yM
t+1 =[ ( 1− τt)βyt]α[θt+1h(τtβyt)]1−α ≡ yM(yt,τt,θt+1)( 1 6 )





where kt+1 is strictly decreasing in τt and in θt+1, and strictly increasing in yt. As follows from
(5), the capital share in the manufacturing sector is
(1 − τt)βytRt+1 = αyM
t+1, (18)
and the labor share in the manufacturing sector is given by
θt+1h(τtβyt)wM
t+1 =( 1− α)yM
t+1. (19)
The supply of labor to agriculture, Lt+1, is equal to 1 − θt+1. Output in the agriculture
sector in period t + 1 is therefore
yA
t+1 = F(X,1 − θt+1) ≡ yA(θt+1;X)( 2 0 )
As follows from the properties of the production functions as long as,X>0, and τt < 1,
noting that yt > 0 for all t, both sectors are active in t + 1. Hence, since individuals can either
supply one unit of labor to the agriculture sector and receive the wage wA
t+1 or supply ht+1 units





t+1 ≡ wt+1, (21)
and the division of labor between the two sectors, θt+1, noting (3), (5) and (17) is determined
accordingly.
Since the number of individuals in each generation is normalized to 1, aggregate wage
income in the economy, which equals to the sum of labor shares in the two sectors, equals wt+1.
Namely, as follows from (3), (19) and (20),
wt+1 =( 1− θt+1)FL(X,1 − θt+1)+( 1− α)yM
t+1. (22)
12Lemma 1 The fraction of workers employed by the manufacturing sector in period t+1, θt+1 :
(a) is uniquely determined:
θt+1 = θ(yt,τt;X),
where θX(yt,τt;X) < 0, θy(yt,τt;X) > 0, and limy→∞ θ(yt,τt;X)=1 .
(b) maximizes the aggregate wage income, wt+1, and output yt+1 in period t +1:
θt+1 =a r gm a xwt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1.
Proof.
(a) Substitution (3), (5), and (17) into (21) it follows that






and therefore the Lemma follows from the properties of the agriculture production technology,
F(X,Lt), and the concavity of h(et).
(b)S i n c eθt+1 equalizes the marginal return to labor in the two sectors, and since the marginal
product of factors is decreasing in both sectors, part (b) follows. ¤





Proof. Follows from (3), (5), (17), (20) and Lemma 1. ¤
3.4 Eﬃcient Expenditure on Public Education
This section demonstrates that the level of expenditure on public schooling (and hence the level
of taxation) that maximizes aggregate output is optimal from the viewpoint of all individuals
except for landowners who own a large fraction of the land in the economy.
Lemma 2 Let τ∗








t = τ∗(yt) ∈ (0,1) and τ∗(yt)yt, is strictly increasing in yt.
(c) τ∗
t =a r gm a xwt+1 and dwt+1/dτt > 0 for τt ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
(d) τ∗
t =a r gm i nρt+1 and dρt+1/dτt < 0 for τt ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
(e) τ∗
t =a r gm a xθ(yt,τt;X) and dθ(yt,τt;X)/dτt > 0 for τt ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
(f) τ∗
t =a r gm a xyM
t+1 and dyM
t+1/dτt > 0 for τt ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
(g) τ∗
t =a r gm a x ( 1− τt)Rt+1 and d(1 − τt)Rt+1/dτt > 0 for τt ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
Proof.
(a) As follows from (16) and (20) aggregate output in period t +1 ,y t+1 is
yt+1 = yM(yt,τt,θt+1)+yA(θt+1;X). (24)
Hence, since τ∗
t =a r gm a xyt+1 and since, as established in Lemma 1, θt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1, it
follows form the envelop theorem that the value of τ∗
t satisﬁes the condition in part (a).











t = τ∗(yt) < 1a n dτ∗
t > 0f o ra l lyt > 0( s i n c el i m et→0+ h0(et)=∞)a n dτ∗(yt)yt is
strictly increasing in yt.
(c) Follows from the diﬀerentiation of wt+1 in (22) with respect to τt using the envelop theorem
since, as established in Lemma 1, θt+1 =a r gm a xwt+1.
(d) Follows from part (c) noting that along the factor price frontier ρt decreases in wA
t and
therefore in wt.
(e) Follows from part (c) noting that, as follows from the properties of the production function
(2), Lt+1 and wA
t+1 are inversely related and hence θt+1 =1− Lt+1 is positively related to wA
t+1
and therefore to wt+1.
(f) Follows from diﬀerentiating yM
t+1 in (16) with respect to τt noting that yM
t+1 is strictly in-
creasing in θt+1 and as follows from part (e) dθ(X,yt,τt)/dτt > 0f o rτt ∈ (0,τ∗).
(g) Follows from part (f) noting that, as follows from (18), (1 − τt)Rt+1 = αyM
t+1/(βyt). ¤
The size of the land, X, has two opposing eﬀects on τ∗
t. Since a larger land size implies
that employment in the manufacturing sector is lower, the fraction of the labor force whose
productivity is improved due to taxation that is designed to ﬁnance universal public education is
lower. In contrast, the return to each unit of human capital employed in the manufacturing sector
is higher while the return to physical capital is lower, since human capital in the manufacturing
sector is scarce. Due to the Cobb-Douglass production function in the manufacturing sector the
14two eﬀects cancel one another and as established in Lemma 2 the value of τ∗
t is independent of
the size of land.
Furthermore, since the tax rate is linear and the elasticity of substitution between human
and physical capital in the manufacturing sector is unitary, as established in Lemma 2, the tax
rate that maximizes aggregate output in period t+1 also maximizes the wage per worker, wt+1,
and the net return to capital, (1 − τ∗
t)Rt+1. If the elasticity of substitution would be larger
than unity but ﬁnite, then the tax rate that maximizes the wage per worker would have been
larger than the optimal tax rate and the tax rate that maximizes the return to capital would
have been lower, yet strictly positive. If the elasticity of substitution is smaller than unity, the
opposite holds.
Corollary 2 The optimal level of taxation from the viewpoint of individual i, is τ∗
t for a suﬃ-
ciently low xi.
Proof. Since the indirect utility function, (11), is a strictly increasing function of the individual’s
second period wealth, and since as established in Lemma 2, wt+1, and (1−τt)Rt+1 are maximized
by τ∗
t, it follows from (8) that, for a suﬃciently low xi, τ∗
t =a r gm a xv(Ii
t+1). ¤
Hence, the optimal level of taxation for individuals whose land ownership is suﬃciently
low equals the level of taxation (and hence the level of expenditure on public schooling) that
maximizes aggregate output.
3.5 Political Mechanism
Suppose that changes in the existing educational policy require the consent of all segments of
society. In the absence of consensus the existing educational policy remains intact.28
Suppose that consistently with the historical experience, societies initially do not ﬁnance
education (i.e., τ0 =0 ) . It follows that unless all segments of society would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to
alter the existing educational policy the tax rate will remain zero. Once all segments of society
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to implement educational policy that maximizes aggregate output, this policy
w o u l dr e m a i ni ne ﬀect unless all segment of society would support an alternative policy.
28Clearly, even in democracies, the median voting model is not perfectly applicable. Strong interest groups,
such as landowners, exert a larger inﬂuence on public policy than their representation in the population. For the
sake of simplicity we adopt an extreme modeling approach that provides landowners with a veto power against
education reforms. The adoption of some alternative approaches, such as a lobbing model, would not change the
qualitative result.
153.6 Landlords’ Desirable Schooling Policy
Suppose that in period 0 a fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of all young individuals in society are Landlords
while a fraction 1−λ are landless. Each landlord owns an equal fraction, 1/λ, o ft h ee n t i r es t o c k
of land, X, a n di se n d o w e dw i t hbL
0 units of output. Since landlord are homogeneous in period
0 and since land is bequeathed from parent to child and each individual has a single child and
a single parent, it follows that the distribution of land ownership in society and the division of
capital within the class of landlord is constant over time, where each landlord owns X/λ units
of land and bL
t units of output in period t.
The income of each landlord in the second period of life, IL
t+1, as follows from (8) and
Corollary 1 is therefore
IL
t+1 = w(yt,τt)+( 1− τt)R(yt,τt)bL
t + ρ(yt,τt)X/λ, (25)
and bL
t+1, as follows from (10) is therefore
bL
t+1 = β[w(yt,τt)+( 1− τt)R(yt,τt)bL
t + ρ(yt,τt)X/λ] ≡ bL(yt,b L
t ,τt;X/λ)( 2 6 )
Proposition 1 For any given level of capital and land ownership of each landlord (bL
t ,λ;X)
there exists a suﬃciently high level of output b yt = b y(bL
t ,λ;X) above which the optimal taxation
from a Landlord’s viewpoint, τL




t for yt ≥ b yt
where b y(bL
t ,1;X)=0 ;l i m λ→0 b y(bL
t ,λ;X)=∞;
b yλ(bL
t ,λ;X) < 0; b yX(bL
t ,λ;X) > 0.
Proof. Follows from the properties of the agriculture production function (2), Lemma 1 and 2,
noting that, since 1 − θt+1 =a r gm a xρt+1, for bL
t =0 ,d I L
t+1/dwt+1 > 0i fλ > 1 − θt+1. ¤
Corollary 3 For any given level of capital and land ownership of each landlord (bL
t ,λ;X) there
exists a suﬃciently high level of output b yt = b y(bL
t ,λ;X) above which the level of taxation, τ∗
t,
that maximizes aggregate output, is optimal from the viewpoint of every member of society.




(b) If ˆ t is the ﬁrst period in which τt = τ∗
t then
τt = τ∗
t ∀t ≥ ˆ t.
16Proof. follows from the political structure, Corollary 2 and the assumption that τ0 =0 . ¤









t ≥ ˆ bt;
0 if bL










and there exists a suﬃciently large λ such that, ˆ b(yt,X/λ)=0for any yt.
Proof. Follows from (25) and Lemma 3. ¤
Corollary 4 T h es w i t c ht ot h ee ﬃcient tax rate τ∗
t occurs when bL
t ≥ ˆ bt, i.e.,
bL
t ≥ ˆ bt if and only if t ≥ ˆ t.
4 The Process of Development
This section analyzes the evolution of an economy from an agricultural to an industrial-based
economy. It demonstrates that the gradual decline in the importance of the agricultural sector
along with an increase in the capital holdings in landlords’ portfolio may alter the attitude of
landlords towards educational reforms. In societies in which land is scarce or its ownership is
distributed rather equally, the process of development allows the implementation of an optimal
education policy, and the economy experiences a signiﬁcant investment in human capital and a
rapid process of development. In contrast, in societies where land is abundant and its distribution
is unequal, an ineﬃcient education policy will persist and the economy will experience a lower
growth path as well as lower level of output in the long-run.







1−α + F(X,1 − θt+1) for τ =0 ;
ψ∗(yt) ≡ [(1 − τ∗
t)βyt]α[θt+1h(τ∗
tβyt)]1−α + F(X,1 − θt+1) for τ = τ∗,
where,
ψ∗(yt) > ψ0(yt) for yt > 0.
dψj(yt)/dyt > 0,d 2ψj(yt)/dy2
t < 0, ψj(0) = F(X,1) > 0,d ψj(yt)/dX > 0,a n d
limyt→∞dψj(yt)/dyt =0 ;j =0 ,∗.
17Proof. The proof follows from (1), (13), (15), (16) and (20), applying the envelop theorem not-
i n gt h a t ,a sf o l l o w sf r o mL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 ,θt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1 and τ∗
t =a r gm a xyt+1.¤
Note that the evolution of output per capita, given schooling policy, is independent of the
distribution of land and income.
Corollary 5 Given the size of land, X, there exists a unique ¯ y0 a n dau n i q u e¯ y∗ such that
¯ y0 = ψ0(¯ y0)
and
¯ y∗ = ψ∗(¯ y∗)
where ¯ y∗ > ¯ y0.
1 + t y
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Figure 1: Education Reform and The Evolution of Output
4.1 The Dynamical System





ψ0(yt) for t<ˆ t
ψ∗(yt) for t≥ ˆ t.
The timing of the switch from a zero tax rate to the eﬃcient tax rate τ∗
t occurs, as established
in Corollary 4 once bL
t ≥ ˆ bt. Since τt =0f o ra l lt<ˆ t, and since ˆ bt = ˆ b(yt;X/λ), the timing of
18the switch, ˆ t, is determined by the co evolution of {yt,b L
t } for τt =0
yt+1 = ψ0(yt)
bL
t+1 = b0(yt,b L
t )
Let the bb locus (depicted in Figure 3) be the set of all pairs (bL
t ,y t) such that, for τt =0 ,
bL
t is in a steady state. i.e., bL
t+1 = bL
t .
In order to simplify the exposition of the dynamical system it is assumed that the value
of β is suﬃciently small,
β < 1/R(yt,0) ∀yt (A1)
where as follows from (3), (5) and Lemma 1, R(yt,0) < ∞ for all yt and therefore there exists
as u ﬃciently small β such that A1 holds.
Lemma 5 Under A1, there exists a continuous single-valued function ϕ(yt;X/λ),such that along
the bb locus
bL




where for suﬃciently small λ,
ϕ(0,X/λ) < ˆ b(0,X/λ).
and for λ =1
ˆ b(yt;X/λ) < ϕ(yt;X/λ) for all yt.
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 3, for τ =0 ,
bL
t+1 − bL
t R 0 if and only if bL
t Q ϕ(yt;X/λ).
Proof. Follows from (26), A1, and Lemma 4, noting that for λ =1 ,I L
t = yt and hence
τ∗
t =a r gm a xIL
t+1. ¤
Let yy0 be the locus (depicted in Figure 3) of all pairs (bL
t ,y t) such that, for τt =0 ,yt is
in a steady state equilibrium,. i.e., yt+1 = yt.
Lemma 6
yy0 = {(yt,b L
t ):yt =¯ y0,b L
t ∈ R+}
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 3, for τ =0 ,
yt+1 − yt R 0 if and only if yt Q ¯ y0.
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Figure 2: The Evolution of Output and Landowner’s Bequest
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 and Corollary 5. ¤
Corollary 6 For a suﬃciently low λ there exists y>0 such that
ˆ b(y;X/λ)=ϕ(y;X/λ).
Proof. follows from Lemma 5 and Proposition 16. ¤
Lemma 7 Let ˜ y(X/λ) be the smallest value of yt such that ˆ b(yt;X/λ)=ϕ(yt;X/λ). Under A1
d˜ y(X/λ)/dλ ≤ 0,
where limλ→0 ˜ y(X/λ)=∞.
Proof. It follows from the properties ofˆ b(yt;X/λ)a n dϕ(yt;X/λ), noting that w(yt,τt), ρ(yt,τt)
and R(yt,τt), are independent of λ, and ρ(yt,0) > ρ(yt,τ∗
t) for all yt > 0. ¤
In order to simplify the exposition of the dynamical system it is assumed that ˜ y(X/λ)i s
unique.
Proposition 3 The economy is characterized by:
20t y







Figure 3: The Evolution of Output and Landowner’s Bequest
(a) A unique globally stable steady state equilibrium, ¯ y∗, if ˜ y(X/λ) < ¯ y0, that is if λ is suﬃciently
large.
(b) Two locally stable steady states, ¯ y∗ and ¯ y0, if ˜ y(X/λ) > ¯ y0, that is if λ is suﬃciently small.
Proof. Follows from the political mechanism, the deﬁnition of ˜ y and Lemma 5 and 7. ¤
Theorem 1 Consider countries that are identical in all respects except for their initial land
distribution.
(a) Countries that have a less equal land distribution, i.e., countries with a low level of λ,
will experience a delay in the implementation of eﬃcient education policy and will therefore
experience a lower growth path.
(b) Countries characterize by a suﬃciently unequal distribution of land and suﬃciently low
capital ownership by the landlord will permanently conduct an ineﬃcient education policy and
will therefore experience a lower growth path as well as a lower level of output in the long-run.
Proof. The theorem is a corollary of Proposition 3 and Lemma 3 and 7. ¤
This theorem suggests that the distribution of land within and across countries aﬀected
the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy, generating diverging
growth patterns across countries. Furthermore, land abundance that was beneﬁcial in early
21stages of development, brought about a hurdle for human capital accumulation and economic
growth among countries that were marked by an unequal distribution of land ownership. As
depicted in Figure 4, some land abundant countries which were associated with the club of
the rich economies in the pre-industrial revolution era and were characterized by an unequal
distribution of land, were overtaken in the process of industrialization by land scarce countries.
The qualitative change in the role of land in the process of industrialization has brought about
changes in the ranking of countries in the world income distribution.
1 + t y
t y
B y ] [
* A y ] [
0 B y ˆ
0 45
B
t y ψ )] ( [
*
B








Figure 4: Overtaking — country A is relatively richer in land, however, due to land inequality it
fails to implement eﬃcient schooling and is overtaken by country B. Alternatively, for a lower
degree of inequality, country A will eventually implement education reforms and ultimately
takeover country B (not captured in the ﬁgure).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The proposed theory suggests that land inequality aﬀected the nature of the transition from
an agrarian to an industrial economy generating diverging growth patterns across countries.
Land abundance, which was beneﬁcial in early stages of development, generated in later stages
a hurdle for human capital accumulation and economic growth among countries in which land
ownership was unequally distributed. The qualitative change in the role of land in the process
22of industrialization aﬀected the transition to modern growth and has brought about changes in
the ranking of countries in the world income distribution. Some land abundant countries that
were associated with the club of the rich economies in the pre-industrial revolution era and were
marked by an unequal distribution of land, were overtaken in the process of industrialization
by land scarce countries and were dominated by other land abundant economies in which land
distribution was rather equal.29
The theory abstracts from the sources of distribution of population density across countries
in the pre-industrialization era. The Malthusian mechanism, that positively links population
size to eﬀective resources in each region, suggests that the distribution of population density
in the world economy should reﬂect in the long run the distribution of productive land across
the globe. Hence, one could have argued that signiﬁcant economic variations in eﬀective land
per capita in the long run are unlikely. Nevertheless, there are several sources of variations
in eﬀective resources per-capita in the pre-industrial world. First, due to rapid technological
diﬀusion across countries and continents in the era of “innovations and discoveries” (e.g., via
colonialism) population size in the technologically receiving countries has not completed its
adjustment prior to industrialization, and the population density in several regions was therefore
below its long-run level. Second, inequality in the distribution of land ownership within countries
(due to geographical conditions, for instance) prevented population density from fully reﬂecting
the productivity of land. Variations in population density across the globe may therefore reﬂect
variations in climate, settlement date, disease, colonization, and inequality.
The theory suggest that geographical conditions that were associated with increasing re-
turns in agricultural or in the extraction of natural resources led to the emergence of a class
of wealthy landlords that ultimately aﬀected adversely the implementation of human capital
promoting institutions. Furthermore, geographical conditions were the prime determinant of
the timing of the agricultural revolution [Diamond (1997)] and due to the interaction between
technological progress and population growth [Malthus (1789) and Boserup (1965)] the cause
29Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that low population density in 1500 was beneﬁcial for the implementation
of growth promoting institutions. Thus, one can mistakenly conclude that their ﬁndings may contradict the
hypothesis regarding the adverse eﬀect of land abundance (as measured by eﬀective land per capita) on the
implementation of education reforms. However, in the Malthusian regime that characterized the world prior to
1500, population growth was positively aﬀected by the level of income per capita, and variations in population
density across countries and regions reﬂected diﬀerences in technologies and land quality, rather than diﬀerences
in eﬀective land per capita. In particular, population density reﬂe c t e dl a n dq u a l i t y( b r o a d l yd e ﬁned) and should
not be interpreted as an index for land scarcity. Moreover, the proposed theory suggests that the eﬀect of
land abundance on the implementation of growth promoting institutions depends critically on the degree of land
inequality which is not controlled by Acemoglu et al. (2002). In particular, it is possible that the same geographical
conditions that led to higher population density permitted higher land inequality implying that their ﬁndings may
in fact be consistent with the theory developed in this paper.
23of variation in the level of technology and population density, in geographically isolated regions
despite similar levels of output per capita. Hence, the link that was created between geographi-
cally isolated areas in the era of discoveries, and the associated diﬀusion of technology, generated
geographically-based variations in eﬀective land per capita, that according to the proposed the-
ory led to diﬀerences in the implementation of human capital promoting institutions.
The paper implies that diﬀerences in the evolution of social structures across countries
may reﬂect diﬀerences in the distribution of land ownership. In particular, the dichotomy be-
tween workers and capitalists is more likely to persist in land abundant economies in which land
ownership is unequally distributed. As argued by Galor and Moav (2006), due to the comple-
mentarity between physical and human capital in production, the Capitalists were among the
prime beneﬁciaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They had therefore
the incentive to ﬁnancially support public education that would sustain their proﬁt rates and
would improve their economic well being, although would ultimately undermine their dynasty’s
position in the social ladder and would bring about the demise of the capitalist-workers class
structure. As implied by the current research, the timing and the degree of this social transfor-
mation depend on the economic interest of landlords. In contrast to the Marxian hypothesis, this
paper suggests that workers and capitalists are the natural economic allies that share an interest
in industrial development and therefore in the implementation of growth enhancing human cap-
ital promoting institutions, whereas landlords are the prime hurdle for industrial development
and social mobility.
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